Ok> With regard to Mongolian arbitrating on two Americans, it is a good point.
I gravitate towards building primitives first, and then placing the logic ontop of that. So in the case of Mongolian and then moderating two americans; I’m not sure yet how we can resolve it logically.
(…)
With regard to feedback, we should give ability to make a profile as member of DBOT and allow ratings by being part of DBOT; in addition to successfully completed transactions should allow you to give feedback as well. So DBOT recognized profiles as well as general traders.
Glad you understood that way! When i first wrote it i thought it may lead to a cultural thing, like Common Law or Roman Law, how the referee understands “justice”. I was successful.
I agree with you applying inicially just logic to it. And, i believe it’s a matter of motivations…let me explain. I can see 4 probable actors, that may behave morally or not:
- Small and large buyers;
- Small and large sellers.
i think we are more interested in the relations between the firsts ones, big guys usually have a staff to deal with those kind of conflicts (courts that you mentioned). So:
Relations between small buyers and sellers. I can see profiles working fine for sellers, i’m sure i prefer better rated sellers when i buy stuff on e-bay. On UBER, the passenger is valuated by the driver too.
But i think we can’t trust just on it, a Referee is needed (maybe SEC holders, with incentives, of course). It would be mandatory for him/her to check any proof from the Seller (example: a ticket from mail sent to a buyer, a photo, that receipt of SAFEXUSD that u’ve mentioned) and Buyer (i think it needs to have a guarantee here - equal to the ammount purchased, in case of buyer doesn’t mantain his word, like in a pawn shop). Also, the deal needs to be limited in time (a week, for example). So, three parties are involved (Referee, Buyer and Seller) and it takes 2 to decide what to do when time frame is finished.
Nowadays crypto banks, for example, always favor the buyer (borrowers) side, not claiming a guarantee. Big sellers (lenders in a the case of a bank) can control delinquency rates, but what about small ones?
Another issue, if SEC holders work as referees, it should be considered to rent SEC tokens for people that want to share those arbitrating fees, right?
SEC holders can get an advantage in fees because they win app coins; but still it will cost to put new offers and also to make new assets.
As we are building a network software, you can “farm” the offers and assets that are stored on nodes. So some plan is to have app development incentive, and safex team will have a main interface, and SEC owners would win those app dev coins. Other teams can also build their interface here, but the coin to be farmed is always the same. SEC owners would seed this new network by receiving a small % of all the network’s coins to start making assets and trading. This is how I see it going sofar… Can discuss when formalized the proposal, and the implementation has to be documented as well, simple and to the point something that can be done that satisfies the requirements and also doesn’t get too complex or overgrandiose. Doing this is not the same like trying safe network because we are not trying to build some new internet, just a data network for offers very small data that is predictable (not random data) that is obfuscated and encrypted.
That’s blown my mind! That’s very creative! Reminds me a bit of Piercoin reward.
maidsafe is really behind closed doors even you make many inquiries theres no way to know what they’re up to
Man, if it’s your impression, imagine us outsiders! lol. To me crypto involves trust (kind of non-logical, right? lol), and you have mine, Dan.
Thanks for your considerations and time!